Military drug cases frequently rest on a urinalysis result, and the integrity of that result depends on a tightly regulated collection and chain-of-custody process. When something goes wrong at collection, two very different legal problems can be in play, and they are often confused. One is unlawful command influence, the prohibited interference with the justice process that Article 37 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice forbids. The other is a defect in the collection or chain of custody that goes to the admissibility and reliability of the test. Whether improper command involvement during a urinalysis can lead to dismissal depends on which problem is actually present. Dismissal is possible, but it is reserved for the most serious situations and is not the usual remedy for a flawed sample.
Two distinct problems that look similar
Article 37 prohibits unlawful command influence, which is interference by a convening authority or commander with the fairness of the court-martial process. Classic examples include pressuring witnesses, dictating outcomes, or discouraging people from testifying or assisting the defense. Unlawful command influence has long been described as the mortal enemy of military justice precisely because it strikes at the legitimacy of the proceeding itself.
A urinalysis collection problem is usually something else. If a commander or noncommissioned officer running the collection cut corners, failed to maintain direct observation, left samples unsecured, or broke the documented chain of custody, that is a defect in the evidence. It bears on whether the sample is reliable and whether the result is admissible, not necessarily on whether the court-martial process has been corrupted by command interference. The two can overlap, but they are analyzed differently and carry different remedies.
When the collection problem is really command influence
Improper command involvement during collection rises to unlawful command influence when the command’s conduct interferes with the justice process rather than merely with the sample. Suppose a commander orders the collection process to be manipulated to manufacture or alter evidence, pressures the urinalysis observer or program coordinator to shade their account of what happened, or discourages those people from cooperating with the defense or testifying truthfully about collection irregularities. That kind of conduct reaches Article 37, because it is an attempt to influence the evidence and witnesses that the fact-finder will rely on.
The framework for litigating unlawful command influence is well established. The defense carries the initial burden of raising the issue with some evidence that the influence occurred and that it has a logical connection to the proceeding. Once the defense meets that threshold, the burden shifts to the government, which must prove beyond a reasonable doubt either that the unlawful command influence did not occur or that it did not and will not prejudice the accused. This burden-shifting structure is what gives the doctrine its teeth.
The range of remedies, with dismissal at the far end
When unlawful command influence is found, military judges have broad authority to craft a remedy proportionate to the harm. The remedy is tailored to remove the taint and ensure a fair trial. Lesser measures come first: curative instructions to the panel, disqualifying or replacing tainted personnel such as influenced witnesses or panel members, compelling the production of witnesses who were discouraged from cooperating, suppressing tainted evidence, or changing the venue or convening structure to escape the influence.
Dismissal sits at the far end of that range. It is the most severe sanction and is generally reserved for situations where the unlawful command influence so pervaded or impaired the proceeding that no lesser remedy can restore fairness, or where the government cannot meet its burden of showing the absence of prejudice. So yes, improper command influence during urinalysis collection can warrant dismissal, but only when the influence was serious enough that the fairness of the trial cannot otherwise be salvaged. In many cases a curative remedy or suppression of the tainted result will be enough, and the case proceeds without it.
When the problem is collection error rather than command influence
If the issue is simply that the collection or chain of custody was botched, without any command interference with witnesses or the process, then unlawful command influence is the wrong tool, and dismissal is the wrong remedy to seek. The collection process is governed by detailed requirements: direct observation of the sample by an observer, uninterrupted custody, secure storage, and complete documentation on the specimen custody paperwork that follows the sample from collection through the laboratory. When a link in that chain is missing, undocumented, or handled by unauthorized personnel, the proper attack is on admissibility and weight. The defense moves to exclude or to discredit the result, arguing that the government cannot show the sample is what it claims to be or that the result is reliable. A successful challenge of that kind can gut a drug prosecution by removing its central evidence, even though it is not a dismissal for command influence.
Putting the analysis together
The decisive question is what the command actually did. If a commander or supervisor manipulated the collection to interfere with the evidence, pressured the people involved, or discouraged them from helping the defense or testifying honestly, that is unlawful command influence under Article 37, the government must disprove prejudice beyond a reasonable doubt, and dismissal is available if no lesser remedy can cure the harm. If instead the command simply ran a sloppy collection that broke the chain of custody, that is an evidentiary problem to be litigated through suppression and challenges to reliability, which can still be fatal to the case but through a different door. Counsel should be careful to plead the right theory, because labeling an ordinary chain-of-custody defect as command influence invites the wrong analysis and may obscure a strong suppression argument.
Practical guidance
Improper command influence during urinalysis collection can warrant dismissal, but dismissal is the last resort, used only when the influence corrupted the proceeding so deeply that curative measures, suppression, or replacement of tainted personnel cannot restore a fair trial. The defense should first determine whether the command actually interfered with the justice process and its witnesses, which triggers the Article 37 framework and shifts a beyond-a-reasonable-doubt burden to the government, or whether the real problem is a collection and chain-of-custody defect, which is litigated through admissibility and reliability. Either path can be decisive, but they require different motions, so any service member facing a urinalysis-based charge with suspected command interference should bring the specific facts to military defense counsel as early as possible.
Disclaimer
This article is provided strictly for general educational and informational purposes. It is intended to explain how the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), the Rules for Courts-Martial, the Military Rules of Evidence, and related military administrative processes work as a matter of public legal education. It does not constitute legal advice, a legal opinion, or a recommendation about any particular case, and it is not a substitute for advice from a qualified military defense attorney who can evaluate the specific facts and command, service, and jurisdictional circumstances involved.
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