Article 89 of the UCMJ addresses misconduct toward a superior commissioned officer. Service members sometimes assume that offenses against officers are matters between officers, or that the disrespect articles are tools used only against the lower ranks by their immediate leaders. The reality is more precise. Article 89 applies to any person subject to the UCMJ who disrespects or assaults a superior commissioned officer, and that includes enlisted members. The question is not whether an enlisted member can be charged, but what the government must prove for the charge to stick.
What Article 89 covers
Article 89, codified at 10 U.S.C. 889, reaches conduct toward a superior commissioned officer. As reorganized by the Military Justice Act of 2016, the article addresses both disrespect toward a superior commissioned officer and assault on a superior commissioned officer, consolidating offenses that had been distributed differently under the prior code. The disrespect branch is the one most often charged.
The provision applies broadly. It covers any person subject to the UCMJ, a phrase that plainly includes enlisted members. An enlisted soldier, sailor, airman, marine, or guardian who treats a superior commissioned officer with contempt or who behaves disrespectfully toward that officer can be charged under Article 89. The article is not limited to officer-on-officer conduct.
The elements for disrespect
For the disrespect offense, the government must prove that a certain commissioned officer was the object of the conduct; that this officer was the accused’s superior commissioned officer; that the accused knew the officer was the accused’s superior commissioned officer; and that the accused behaved with disrespect toward that officer.
Each element matters for an enlisted accused. The superior status and the accused’s knowledge of it are not formalities; they define the offense.
The superior relationship is essential
The central limit on Article 89 is the requirement that the officer be the accused’s superior commissioned officer. It is not enough that the person disrespected is a commissioned officer somewhere in the service. The officer must be superior to the accused, generally because the officer is in the accused’s chain of command or is superior in rank or command in the circumstances, and that superior relationship must exist at the time of the conduct.
For an enlisted member, virtually every commissioned officer is senior in grade, which makes the superior element easy to establish in most cases. But the relationship still has to be shown. Disrespect toward an officer who, in the specific situation, was not the accused’s superior, for example an officer of another service in a context where no superior relationship existed, may not fit Article 89 even though it could violate another provision such as Article 91 (insubordinate conduct toward a warrant officer, noncommissioned officer, or petty officer) or the General Article. The charge must be matched to the actual relationship.
What counts as disrespect
Disrespect is behavior that detracts from the respect due the authority and person of a superior commissioned officer. It can be conveyed by words or by acts.
Disrespect by language includes abusive epithets and other contemptuous or denunciatory speech directed at or about the officer. Disrespect by act includes neglecting the customary salute, or displaying a marked disdain, indifference, insolence, impertinence, undue familiarity, or other rudeness in the officer’s presence. The disrespect must relate to the officer in the officer’s official capacity rather than as a purely private individual in a wholly personal dispute.
Article 89 is a general-intent offense. The government must prove that the accused knew the person was a superior commissioned officer, but it need not prove a specific intent to be disrespectful. It is the disrespectful character of the conduct, judged objectively, that matters, along with knowledge of the officer’s status.
Defenses an enlisted accused may raise
Because the elements are specific, an enlisted member charged under Article 89 has several lines of defense. The accused may contest knowledge, arguing a genuine and reasonable lack of awareness that the person was a superior commissioned officer, which can arise when an officer is in civilian clothes or otherwise not identifiable. The accused may contest the superior relationship, showing that the officer was not in fact the accused’s superior in the circumstances. The accused may contest the character of the conduct, arguing that the words or acts were not objectively disrespectful or were not directed at the officer in an official capacity. And the accused may point to provocation or surrounding circumstances that bear on whether the conduct crossed the line, although such factors usually go to mitigation rather than to a complete defense.
Bottom line
Yes, an enlisted member can be charged under Article 89. The article applies to any person subject to the UCMJ, and enlisted members are squarely within that reach when they disrespect or assault a superior commissioned officer. To convict, the government must prove that the officer was the accused’s superior commissioned officer, that the accused knew it, and that the accused behaved disrespectfully toward the officer in an official capacity. The frequent assumption that Article 89 is reserved for officers is simply wrong; the real questions in an enlisted case are whether the superior relationship and the accused’s knowledge of it are established and whether the conduct was genuinely disrespectful.
Disclaimer
This article is provided strictly for general educational and informational purposes. It is intended to explain how the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), the Rules for Courts-Martial, the Military Rules of Evidence, and related military administrative processes work as a matter of public legal education. It does not constitute legal advice, a legal opinion, or a recommendation about any particular case, and it is not a substitute for advice from a qualified military defense attorney who can evaluate the specific facts and command, service, and jurisdictional circumstances involved.
Reading this article, or contacting any website on which it appears, does not create an attorney-client relationship between the reader and any law firm, attorney, or author. Every court-martial, nonjudicial punishment action, administrative separation, and security-clearance matter turns on its own facts, the charged articles, the convening authority, the service branch, and the evidence, and outcomes vary widely from one case to another.
Military law also changes over time. The Military Justice Act of 2016 (effective January 1, 2019) and subsequent National Defense Authorization Acts renumbered and rewrote many punitive articles, revised the Article 32 preliminary hearing, and altered sentencing, clemency, and appellate procedures. Statutes, regulations, executive orders, the Manual for Courts-Martial, and decisions of the service Courts of Criminal Appeals and the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces may have been amended, superseded, or reinterpreted after this article was written, and article numbers or procedures cited here may have changed.
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