Article 92 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, codified at 10 U.S.C. 892, punishes failures to obey orders and regulations and dereliction of duty. A common defense theme is that the member did not really disobey, but instead misunderstood what the order required or how far it reached. Whether that misunderstanding is a defense depends on which part of Article 92 is charged and on what the government must prove about the member’s state of mind. The scope of an order, and the member’s understanding of that scope, can be decisive.
The three offenses inside Article 92
Article 92 reaches three distinct things. The first is violating or failing to obey a lawful general order or regulation. The second is, having knowledge of any other lawful order that it is the member’s duty to obey, failing to obey that order. The third is being derelict in the performance of duties. These clauses carry different elements and different knowledge requirements, and that difference is the key to how a misunderstanding of scope is treated.
Under the first clause, for a lawful general order or regulation, knowledge is not a separate element. General orders and regulations are presumed known throughout the command, so the government does not have to prove the accused knew of the order. Under the second clause, for any other lawful order, the government must prove the accused had actual knowledge of the order. Under the third clause, dereliction requires that the accused had a duty, knew or reasonably should have known of it, and was willfully or negligently derelict.
Why “scope” is different from “knowledge”
A misunderstanding about the scope of an order is not quite the same as not knowing the order exists. A member may fully know that an order was issued yet sincerely misread how far it extends, what conduct it covers, or whether it applies to a particular situation. The legal question is whether that misunderstanding negates an element the government must prove.
For a general order or regulation under the first clause, the lack of a knowledge element makes a pure scope-misunderstanding harder to use, because the offense does not depend on the member’s subjective awareness. The order is presumed known. Even so, the conduct must actually fall within what the order prohibits or requires. If the member’s reading is correct and the conduct was outside the order’s actual scope, then there was no violation at all; the issue there is interpretation of the order, not the member’s mental state. If the conduct did fall within the order’s terms, a claim that the member personally read the order more narrowly faces an uphill battle under the first clause.
For an order under the second clause, knowledge is an element, and the member must have understood the order well enough to have the duty to obey it. A genuine misunderstanding about what the order required can bear on whether the member knowingly failed to obey. If the order was ambiguous about its scope and the member reasonably understood it not to cover the conduct at issue, the government may not be able to show a knowing failure to obey the order as actually given.
The role of clarity and ambiguity in the order
Because so much turns on understanding, the clarity of the order is often the heart of the case. An order that is precise about its scope leaves little room for a credible misunderstanding and supports a finding that any deviation was a real violation. An order that is vague, internally inconsistent, or reasonably open to more than one reading gives genuine force to a scope-misunderstanding defense, particularly under the second clause where knowledge matters. A member who reasonably interpreted an ambiguous order in a way that did not cover the conduct can argue that there was no knowing disobedience of the order as the member understood it.
The reasonableness of the interpretation is central. A strained or self-serving reading offered only after the fact carries little weight. A reading that an ordinary, reasonable member in the same position would have adopted carries much more, and it can show that the apparent disobedience was actually a good-faith effort to comply with an unclear directive.
Mistake of fact and the misunderstanding defense
A misunderstanding about an order’s scope is, in substance, a mistake about what the order required. For an offense that depends on knowledge or on a willful or negligent mental state, an honest mistake can be relevant. Under the second clause, an honest and reasonable misunderstanding that the order did not reach the conduct can undercut proof that the member knowingly failed to obey. Under the dereliction clause, a member who reasonably misunderstood the duty may not have acted willfully, and the analysis then turns to whether the member should have known of the duty and was at least negligent. The defense is strongest when the misunderstanding is both honest and objectively reasonable in light of how the order was written and communicated.
How the issue is litigated
In a contested case, both sides focus on the exact words of the order and the surrounding circumstances. The defense will press whether the order clearly covered the conduct, whether it was ambiguous about its scope, how it was communicated, whether the member sought or received any clarification, and whether the member’s interpretation was reasonable. The defense will also identify which clause the government is using, since that determines whether knowledge is even at issue. The prosecution will argue that the order plainly covered the conduct, that any reasonable member would have understood its scope, and that the member’s claimed misunderstanding is not credible. Where the order is a general order or regulation, the prosecution will emphasize that knowledge is presumed and that the conduct fell within the order’s terms.
Practical guidance
If you are charged under Article 92 and your position is that you misunderstood the scope of the order, start by pinning down the precise text of the order and identifying which clause the government has charged. Determine whether the order was a general order or regulation, where knowledge is presumed, or another lawful order, where the government must prove you knew of it. Gather evidence that the order was ambiguous, that your reading was reasonable, and that any deviation reflected a good-faith effort to comply rather than a refusal. Avoid assuming that simply asserting confusion will defeat the charge, especially under the first clause. Because the clauses differ so much in what the government must prove, and because the body of military orders and regulations is frequently updated and renumbered, consult a military defense attorney to match your facts to the correct clause and theory.
Bottom line
Article 92 is applied to a misunderstanding-of-scope defense according to which clause is charged. For a lawful general order or regulation, knowledge is presumed, so a claim that you personally read the order narrowly is weak unless the conduct truly fell outside the order’s actual terms. For another lawful order, the government must prove you knew of the order, and an honest, reasonable misunderstanding about what it required can undercut proof of a knowing failure to obey. For dereliction, a reasonable misunderstanding bears on willfulness. In every version, the clarity of the order and the reasonableness of your interpretation are the decisive factors.
Disclaimer
This article is provided strictly for general educational and informational purposes. It is intended to explain how the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), the Rules for Courts-Martial, the Military Rules of Evidence, and related military administrative processes work as a matter of public legal education. It does not constitute legal advice, a legal opinion, or a recommendation about any particular case, and it is not a substitute for advice from a qualified military defense attorney who can evaluate the specific facts and command, service, and jurisdictional circumstances involved.
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Military law also changes over time. The Military Justice Act of 2016 (effective January 1, 2019) and subsequent National Defense Authorization Acts renumbered and rewrote many punitive articles, revised the Article 32 preliminary hearing, and altered sentencing, clemency, and appellate procedures. Statutes, regulations, executive orders, the Manual for Courts-Martial, and decisions of the service Courts of Criminal Appeals and the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces may have been amended, superseded, or reinterpreted after this article was written, and article numbers or procedures cited here may have changed.
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