How is selective enforcement of regulations addressed when defending against Article 92 allegations?

Article 92 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. 892, makes it an offense to violate or fail to obey a lawful general order or regulation, to fail to obey another lawful order, or to be derelict in the performance of duties. Article 92 charges frequently arise from broadly worded regulations that, in practice, are violated by many service members but enforced against only a few. When that happens, the defense often raises selective enforcement. Understanding how that argument works, and what it can and cannot accomplish, is essential to mounting a credible defense.

The Structure of an Article 92 Case

Most Article 92 prosecutions for violating a general order require the government to prove that a lawful general order or regulation was in effect, that the accused had a duty to obey it, and that the accused violated or failed to obey it. For violations of “other” lawful orders, the government must also prove that the accused had knowledge of the order. Dereliction-of-duty theories require proof of a duty, knowledge of the duty, and willful or negligent failure to perform it. Each of these elements is a potential pressure point, and selective enforcement interacts with several of them.

What Selective Enforcement Means in This Context

Selective enforcement, in the military setting, is the contention that the accused is being singled out for prosecution under a regulation that the command routinely tolerates or ignores when others violate it. The argument has two distinct dimensions, and it is important not to conflate them.

The first dimension is constitutional. A true selective-prosecution claim, as recognized in federal practice and carried into military justice, asserts that the decision to prosecute was based on an impermissible motive, such as the accused’s race, religion, protected speech, or exercise of a legal right, and that similarly situated individuals were not prosecuted. This is a demanding standard. It requires more than showing that others got away with the same conduct; it requires evidence that the enforcement decision was both discriminatory in effect and motivated by a forbidden purpose. Claims of this kind are litigated as motions and rarely succeed, but they remain a recognized avenue where the facts support an improper motive.

The second dimension is evidentiary and practical, and it is where selective enforcement most often does real work. Even when a claim falls short of the constitutional standard, evidence that a regulation was widely disregarded can undercut the government’s case in tangible ways.

How Uneven Enforcement Undercuts the Government’s Case

A regulation that is honored in the breach can be attacked on several grounds. If a general order is routinely ignored across a unit, the defense may argue that it was effectively rescinded or no longer in force as an enforced rule, going to the element that a valid, operative regulation existed. Widespread tolerance can also support a vagueness or fair-notice argument, that the regulation, as actually applied, failed to give service members reasonable notice of what was prohibited.

Selective enforcement also bears on knowledge and intent, particularly under dereliction or “other lawful order” theories. If the command tolerated the conduct generally, the accused may not have understood the regulation to impose a real, enforced duty, which complicates the government’s proof that the accused knowingly or willfully failed to comply. And in cases turning on whether conduct was prejudicial to good order and discipline, evidence that the same conduct was common and unremarked can weaken the claim that this instance harmed discipline.

Selective Enforcement and Unlawful Command Influence

There is a related concern that often travels alongside selective-enforcement arguments. When a command picks out one service member for prosecution while overlooking others, the defense should examine whether the disparity reflects unlawful command influence or improper motive, such as retaliation, personal animus, or pressure from above to make an example of someone. Unlawful command influence is treated very seriously in military justice and can lead to dismissal of charges or other remedies where it taints the prosecution. Selective enforcement evidence can be the thread that surfaces such a problem.

Sentencing and Disposition Effects

Even where selective enforcement does not defeat a finding of guilt, it remains powerful at the disposition and sentencing stages. Demonstrating that the accused engaged in conduct that the command otherwise tolerated speaks directly to fairness and proportionality. It can support arguments for non-judicial disposition rather than court-martial, for administrative resolution, or for a substantially lighter sentence. A panel or convening authority confronted with proof that many violated the same rule without consequence may view a harsh result against one person as unjust.

Building the Argument

A selective-enforcement defense is only as strong as its factual foundation. That foundation typically comes from evidence that others engaged in the same conduct without consequence, comparative records of how the regulation has been enforced, witness testimony about command practice, and any indication of an improper reason for singling out the accused. Discovery requests and careful investigation are often necessary to develop this proof, because the relevant comparators and the command’s enforcement history are not always apparent on the face of the charge sheet.

The Bottom Line

Selective enforcement is addressed at multiple levels of an Article 92 defense. As a constitutional selective-prosecution claim it is difficult but available where an improper motive can be shown. As an evidentiary matter it can attack the existence, notice, and force of the regulation, the accused’s knowledge and intent, and the claim of harm to discipline, and it can expose unlawful command influence. And as a matter of fairness it can shape disposition and sentencing. How much it can accomplish depends on the specific regulation, the command’s enforcement history, and the evidence available, all of which warrant close analysis by experienced military defense counsel.

Disclaimer

This article is provided strictly for general educational and informational purposes. It is intended to explain how the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), the Rules for Courts-Martial, the Military Rules of Evidence, and related military administrative processes work as a matter of public legal education. It does not constitute legal advice, a legal opinion, or a recommendation about any particular case, and it is not a substitute for advice from a qualified military defense attorney who can evaluate the specific facts and command, service, and jurisdictional circumstances involved.

Reading this article, or contacting any website on which it appears, does not create an attorney-client relationship between the reader and any law firm, attorney, or author. Every court-martial, nonjudicial punishment action, administrative separation, and security-clearance matter turns on its own facts, the charged articles, the convening authority, the service branch, and the evidence, and outcomes vary widely from one case to another.

Military law also changes over time. The Military Justice Act of 2016 (effective January 1, 2019) and subsequent National Defense Authorization Acts renumbered and rewrote many punitive articles, revised the Article 32 preliminary hearing, and altered sentencing, clemency, and appellate procedures. Statutes, regulations, executive orders, the Manual for Courts-Martial, and decisions of the service Courts of Criminal Appeals and the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces may have been amended, superseded, or reinterpreted after this article was written, and article numbers or procedures cited here may have changed.

For these reasons, no reader should act or decline to act based on this content without first consulting a licensed attorney experienced in military justice about their own situation. The author and publisher make no warranty, express or implied, as to the accuracy, completeness, timeliness, or current applicability of the information provided, and disclaim any liability for any action taken or not taken in reliance on it. If you are facing investigation, charges, or an adverse administrative action, time limits may apply, and you should seek qualified counsel promptly.

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *