This question sits at the boundary between a completed offense and an attempt, and it has a genuine but carefully limited answer. In principle, an attempt to commit insubordinate conduct under Article 91 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice can be charged under Article 80, the general attempt provision. But whether such a charge fits depends entirely on the facts, and in many situations the better characterization is that a completed offense already occurred. The phrase in the question, that the order was not fully disobeyed, is doing a lot of work, and it must be unpacked.
The completed offense under Article 91
Article 91 punishes insubordinate conduct by an enlisted member or warrant officer toward a warrant officer, noncommissioned officer, or petty officer. It covers three kinds of conduct: striking or assaulting such an officer in the execution of office; willfully disobeying the lawful order of such an officer; and treating such an officer with contempt or being disrespectful in language or deportment while the officer is in the execution of office.
For the willful-disobedience form, the government must prove that the accused knew the person was a warrant, noncommissioned, or petty officer; that the accused had a duty to obey the order; and that the accused willfully disobeyed it. Willful disobedience means an intentional defiance of authority. Crucially, the offense is complete the moment the accused intentionally defies the order. Disobedience does not require that the accused successfully thwart the order’s objective or that the underlying task go undone. A flat refusal, an intentional failure to comply within the time and manner required, or a deliberate act of defiance completes the offense even if the order is later carried out by someone else or eventually obeyed under pressure.
This is why the premise of the question matters so much. If the accused intentionally defied the order at all, the willful-disobedience offense is generally already complete, and there is no need to resort to attempt. Many situations that feel like a partial or unsuccessful disobedience are in fact completed violations of Article 91.
What Article 80 requires for an attempt
Article 80 defines an attempt as an act, done with specific intent to commit an offense under the code, amounting to more than mere preparation and tending, even though failing, to effect its commission. The recognized elements are that the accused did an overt act, that the act was done with specific intent to commit a certain offense under the code, that the act amounted to more than mere preparation, and that the act apparently tended to effect the commission of the intended offense.
Article 80 is broad. It can attach to a wide range of underlying offenses, and military authorities recognize that even violations connected to orders can be charged in attempt form in appropriate cases. So as a structural matter, there is no categorical bar to charging an attempt to commit Article 91 insubordinate conduct through Article 80.
Where attempt actually fits
The narrow space where attempted insubordination makes sense is where the accused had the specific intent to commit the Article 91 offense and took a substantial step toward it, more than mere preparation, but for some reason the elements of the completed offense were not all satisfied. Consider a member who forms the intent to assault a noncommissioned officer in the execution of office and lunges or swings but is restrained before contact, in a way that falls short of a completed assault. That is a classic attempt scenario: the intent and the overt act are present, but the completed offense did not occur.
For the disobedience branch, the fit is harder to find, precisely because the offense completes at the moment of intentional defiance. An attempt theory would require a case where the accused intended to disobey and took a real step toward defiance but where, on the facts, the defiance itself was not consummated, for instance where the act was interrupted before any actual disobedience occurred. Because willful disobedience is itself essentially an act of defiance rather than a result crime, genuine attempted-disobedience cases are uncommon, and prosecutors usually charge the completed offense when any intentional defiance has happened.
Attempt as a lesser framework, not a fallback for any shortfall
Attempt under Article 80 also functions as a lesser-included concept in relation to certain completed offenses, which is why a factfinder may sometimes convict of an attempt when the completed offense is not fully proven. But this does not mean that any time an order is not entirely thwarted the conduct collapses into a mere attempt. The opposite is often true: intentional defiance completes the substantive offense regardless of the ultimate outcome. Article 80 is not a catchall to be invoked whenever the practical effect of disobedience was limited.
The specific-intent requirement is also a real constraint. Article 80 demands a specific intent to commit the underlying offense. Hesitation, ambiguity, or conduct that merely looks like reluctance, without a proven intent to defy and an overt act beyond preparation, will not support an attempt conviction any more than it would support the completed charge.
The bottom line
Attempted insubordination under Article 91 can be charged through Article 80, but only where the facts show specific intent to commit the Article 91 offense plus an overt act amounting to more than mere preparation, in a situation where the completed offense was not consummated. The assault branch of Article 91 lends itself to attempt analysis more naturally than the disobedience branch, because willful disobedience is generally complete at the moment of intentional defiance and does not depend on whether the order’s purpose was ultimately frustrated. The mere fact that an order was not fully disobeyed does not by itself convert the conduct into an Article 80 attempt; the controlling questions are whether the accused intentionally defied the authority at all, and if not, whether intent plus a substantial step toward the offense can be proven.
Disclaimer
This article is provided strictly for general educational and informational purposes. It is intended to explain how the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), the Rules for Courts-Martial, the Military Rules of Evidence, and related military administrative processes work as a matter of public legal education. It does not constitute legal advice, a legal opinion, or a recommendation about any particular case, and it is not a substitute for advice from a qualified military defense attorney who can evaluate the specific facts and command, service, and jurisdictional circumstances involved.
Reading this article, or contacting any website on which it appears, does not create an attorney-client relationship between the reader and any law firm, attorney, or author. Every court-martial, nonjudicial punishment action, administrative separation, and security-clearance matter turns on its own facts, the charged articles, the convening authority, the service branch, and the evidence, and outcomes vary widely from one case to another.
Military law also changes over time. The Military Justice Act of 2016 (effective January 1, 2019) and subsequent National Defense Authorization Acts renumbered and rewrote many punitive articles, revised the Article 32 preliminary hearing, and altered sentencing, clemency, and appellate procedures. Statutes, regulations, executive orders, the Manual for Courts-Martial, and decisions of the service Courts of Criminal Appeals and the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces may have been amended, superseded, or reinterpreted after this article was written, and article numbers or procedures cited here may have changed.
For these reasons, no reader should act or decline to act based on this content without first consulting a licensed attorney experienced in military justice about their own situation. The author and publisher make no warranty, express or implied, as to the accuracy, completeness, timeliness, or current applicability of the information provided, and disclaim any liability for any action taken or not taken in reliance on it. If you are facing investigation, charges, or an adverse administrative action, time limits may apply, and you should seek qualified counsel promptly.