Hazing is not automatically a violation of Article 93 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Article 93, codified at 10 U.S.C. 893, punishes cruelty toward, or oppression or maltreatment of, a person subject to the accused’s orders. Whether an act of hazing fits that article depends on whether the specific elements of Article 93 are present in the particular case. Some hazing fits Article 93; some does not and must be charged under other articles. The label “hazing” comes from Department of Defense and service policy, not from a single punitive article, and the policy definition and the criminal elements are not the same thing.
Hazing is defined by policy, not by one UCMJ article
The prohibition on hazing originates in Department of Defense and service-level policy. Broadly, those policies define hazing as conduct, with a nexus to military service and without a proper military or governmental purpose, that physically or psychologically injures or risks injury to one or more service members. The policies make clear that hazing need not involve physical contact and can be verbal or psychological. Each service issues its own implementing guidance, with definitions that vary in their details.
Crucially, that policy framework tells commanders what to prohibit and investigate. It does not, by itself, establish a criminal offense. When hazing is prosecuted, it must be charged under one or more punitive articles of the UCMJ, and Article 93 is only one of the available options.
When hazing satisfies Article 93
For hazing to be a violation of Article 93, the same two elements that govern every Article 93 case must be met. First, the victim must have been subject to the orders of the accused. Second, the accused must have been cruel toward, oppressed, or maltreated that person. Article 93 does not require proof that the victim actually suffered physical or mental harm; it is enough that the accused’s conduct, measured objectively, was abusive or could reasonably have caused harm or suffering. Article 93 also is not limited to physical abuse, so humiliating, degrading, or harassing treatment can qualify.
A hazing incident in which a member with authority over a junior member subjects that junior to abusive or degrading treatment as part of an initiation or “rite of passage” can therefore satisfy Article 93. The authority relationship supplies the first element, and the cruel or degrading nature of the treatment supplies the second.
When hazing does not fit Article 93
Hazing does not satisfy Article 93 when the relationship element is missing. If the hazing occurs between true peers, with no member subject to the other’s orders, the first element of Article 93 cannot be met, and the conduct must be charged under a different article even though it is plainly hazing under policy. This is the most important reason hazing is not automatically an Article 93 violation. A great deal of hazing happens among peers or within informal groups where no authority relationship exists between the specific accused and the specific victim.
In those situations, and often even where Article 93 also fits, prosecutors turn to other articles. Violation of a lawful general order or regulation, including the service regulations that prohibit hazing, can be charged under Article 92. Physical hazing that involves an unlawful touching or injury can be charged as assault under Article 128, or as maiming under Article 124 where serious injury results. A wide range of hazing conduct can be charged under the general article, Article 134, when it is prejudicial to good order and discipline or service-discrediting. Communicating threats and similar misconduct fit there as well.
The charging decision is fact-driven
Because hazing can implicate several articles, the government selects the article or articles that match the proven facts. A single hazing episode might support an Article 92 charge for violating the anti-hazing regulation, an Article 128 charge for the physical acts, and, if an authority relationship existed, an Article 93 charge for maltreatment. The convening authority and trial counsel weigh which charges the evidence supports, subject to the rules against unreasonable multiplication of charges. Nothing in this process makes Article 93 the default.
What this means in practice
The practical takeaway is that asking whether a given incident “is” an Article 93 violation requires examining the elements, not the label. The two questions that decide the Article 93 issue are whether the victim was subject to the accused’s orders and whether the treatment was cruel, oppressive, or otherwise maltreatment. If both are answered yes, the hazing can be charged under Article 93. If the authority relationship is absent, the conduct remains punishable, but under Article 92, Article 128, Article 134, or another fitting article rather than Article 93.
Bottom line
Hazing is not automatically a violation of Article 93. Article 93 requires that the victim be subject to the orders of the accused and that the accused was cruel toward, oppressed, or maltreated that person. Hazing that meets those criteria can be prosecuted under Article 93, while hazing that does not, most commonly peer-on-peer hazing, must be charged under other UCMJ articles such as Article 92, Article 128, or Article 134. Anyone accused of hazing, and any victim seeking accountability, should consult qualified military defense counsel to determine which article actually fits the facts.
Disclaimer
This article is provided strictly for general educational and informational purposes. It is intended to explain how the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), the Rules for Courts-Martial, the Military Rules of Evidence, and related military administrative processes work as a matter of public legal education. It does not constitute legal advice, a legal opinion, or a recommendation about any particular case, and it is not a substitute for advice from a qualified military defense attorney who can evaluate the specific facts and command, service, and jurisdictional circumstances involved.
Reading this article, or contacting any website on which it appears, does not create an attorney-client relationship between the reader and any law firm, attorney, or author. Every court-martial, nonjudicial punishment action, administrative separation, and security-clearance matter turns on its own facts, the charged articles, the convening authority, the service branch, and the evidence, and outcomes vary widely from one case to another.
Military law also changes over time. The Military Justice Act of 2016 (effective January 1, 2019) and subsequent National Defense Authorization Acts renumbered and rewrote many punitive articles, revised the Article 32 preliminary hearing, and altered sentencing, clemency, and appellate procedures. Statutes, regulations, executive orders, the Manual for Courts-Martial, and decisions of the service Courts of Criminal Appeals and the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces may have been amended, superseded, or reinterpreted after this article was written, and article numbers or procedures cited here may have changed.
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