SHARP, the Army’s Sexual Harassment/Assault Response and Prevention program, includes mandatory training that service members are ordered to complete, and the other services run comparable programs under different names. Refusing to take that training is not a freestanding crime named in the UCMJ, but it can absolutely be punishable, because refusing a lawful order to attend mandatory training can violate Article 92, failure to obey a lawful order or regulation, and can also amount to dereliction of duty. Whether and how it is punished depends on the nature of the order, the member’s knowledge, and the command’s choice of disciplinary tool.
There is no UCMJ article specifically about SHARP training
The first thing to clarify is that the UCMJ does not contain an article that says, in so many words, that skipping SHARP training is an offense. The misconduct is punished indirectly, through the general provisions that criminalize disobedience and neglect of duty. So the question is not whether a special SHARP statute applies, but whether the refusal fits within an existing punitive article.
Article 92 and the lawful order to train
Article 92 makes it an offense to violate or fail to obey a lawful general order or regulation, or any other lawful order that the member has a duty to obey, and it also reaches dereliction in the performance of duties. Mandatory training such as SHARP is typically directed by command policy, regulation, or a specific order, and attendance is a duty. When a member is properly ordered to attend and willfully refuses, that refusal can be charged as a failure to obey under Article 92.
To prove an Article 92 violation of this kind, the government generally must show that there was a lawful order or regulation requiring the training, that the member knew of the order or had a duty to know it, and that the member failed to obey. The order must be lawful, meaning it relates to a military duty and does not direct something illegal. A directive to complete annual SHARP training plainly relates to good order, discipline, and a lawful command interest, so a refusal to comply is the sort of disobedience Article 92 addresses.
Article 92 also covers dereliction of duty, which can apply when a member who has a known duty to complete required training willfully or through neglect fails to do so. Depending on the facts, a command may frame the misconduct as disobedience of an order, as a violation of a regulation, or as dereliction.
A direct order from a superior
If a superior commissioned officer personally and directly orders the member to attend the training and the member refuses, the conduct can also implicate the more serious offense of willfully disobeying a superior commissioned officer under Article 90, or disobeying a superior noncommissioned or petty officer under Article 91, depending on who gave the order. These articles target disobedience of a specific, personal order rather than a general regulation, and they can carry heavier exposure. In most routine training situations the conduct is handled as an Article 92 matter, but a pointed refusal of a direct personal order can elevate the charge.
How commands actually respond
Even though refusing mandatory training is punishable, most cases never reach a court-martial. Commanders frequently address this kind of minor disciplinary problem through nonjudicial punishment under Article 15, which lets them impose limited penalties without a trial. Counseling, corrective training, and adverse administrative actions such as unfavorable evaluations or a reprimand are also common responses. A court-martial is reserved for more serious or repeated misconduct. The maximum punishment that Article 92 authorizes for the most serious violations can include a punitive discharge and confinement, but those outcomes are uncommon for a simple training refusal and would depend on aggravating circumstances.
Lawfulness and reasonable limits
Because the offense depends on disobeying a lawful order, the lawfulness of the directive is the natural point of any defense. An order is presumed lawful if it relates to military duty, and a routine, generally applicable requirement to complete SHARP training comfortably meets that test. A member who believes a particular order is unlawful takes a significant risk by simply refusing; the safer course is to comply and raise objections through proper channels, because a mistaken belief about lawfulness is generally not a defense to disobedience. Genuine inability to comply, as opposed to refusal, can bear on whether the failure was willful or neglectful, which is relevant to dereliction theories.
The bottom line
Refusal to participate in SHARP training can be a punishable offense under the UCMJ, not because there is a SHARP specific statute but because the refusal can violate Article 92 as a failure to obey a lawful order or regulation, or as dereliction of duty, and in the case of a direct personal order from a superior it can implicate Article 90 or Article 91. The training is a lawful, duty-related requirement, so disobeying it fits squarely within these provisions. In practice, commands usually handle a training refusal with counseling, corrective measures, or nonjudicial punishment rather than a court-martial, reserving the heavier penalties Article 92 allows for aggravated or repeated misconduct. A member who objects to the training is far better protected by complying and raising concerns through proper channels than by refusing outright.
Disclaimer
This article is provided strictly for general educational and informational purposes. It is intended to explain how the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), the Rules for Courts-Martial, the Military Rules of Evidence, and related military administrative processes work as a matter of public legal education. It does not constitute legal advice, a legal opinion, or a recommendation about any particular case, and it is not a substitute for advice from a qualified military defense attorney who can evaluate the specific facts and command, service, and jurisdictional circumstances involved.
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