Solicitation in the military means urging, advising, or requesting another person to commit an offense. A reasonable question is whether the rank of the person being solicited changes the analysis: is it judged differently to solicit a superior than to solicit a peer? Under Article 82 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), the answer is that the standard is the same. The rank of the person solicited is not an element of the offense. What matters is what offense the accused tried to bring about and the accused’s intent, not whether the listener outranked, equaled, or was junior to the accused.
What Article 82 punishes after the 2019 changes
The Military Justice Act of 2019 reshaped Article 82 into a general solicitation provision. As amended, Article 82 reaches any person subject to the UCMJ who solicits or advises another to commit an offense under the code. Subsection (a) is the general rule: soliciting or advising another to commit any UCMJ offense, other than the specifically enumerated ones, is punishable as a court-martial may direct. Subsection (b) addresses the four most serious targets, desertion, mutiny, misbehavior before the enemy, and sedition, with enhanced consequences, including that if the solicited offense is actually attempted or committed, the punishment can match that of the underlying offense.
The defining feature is the object of the solicitation, the offense the accused urged, not the identity or rank of the person urged. Nothing in the statute keys liability to whether the solicited person was a superior or a peer.
The elements focus on conduct and intent, not rank
To prove solicitation, the government must show that the accused solicited or advised another person to commit a UCMJ offense and did so with the intent that the offense be committed. For the enumerated offenses in subsection (b), the statute adds the possibility of enhanced punishment tied to whether the solicited crime was attempted or committed. In each case the analysis runs through the same questions: What did the accused ask the other person to do? Did the accused intend that it actually happen? Was the thing solicited an offense under the code? The relative rank of the listener does not appear among these elements.
This means a private who solicits a sergeant, a sergeant who solicits a private, and two peers of equal grade are all measured against the identical legal standard under Article 82. The offense is complete upon the communication made with the requisite intent. It does not depend on the listener agreeing, and it does not depend on the listener’s place in the hierarchy.
Where rank can matter, and why that is a different question
It would be a mistake to conclude that rank never has any effect, because rank can matter in two ways that are distinct from the elements of solicitation itself.
First, rank can change what is being solicited. If an accused urges a subordinate to disobey an order, or urges a group to refuse duty, the object of the solicitation may itself be an offense whose seriousness reflects the rank dynamics, and the enumerated offenses such as mutiny inherently involve collective defiance. But that flows from the nature of the solicited offense, not from a separate rule about soliciting superiors versus peers.
Second, rank can affect sentencing and related charging. The circumstances surrounding an offense, including an abuse of a superior position or the targeting of the chain of command, can be relevant aggravation at sentencing. And the same conduct might support other charges. Urging a junior member to commit misconduct could, depending on the facts, also implicate offenses concerning the conduct of superiors toward subordinates, while disrespect or insubordination directed at a superior is addressed by other articles entirely. These are separate offenses with their own standards, not a modified version of solicitation.
Practical takeaway
For the solicitation charge itself, the prosecution does not get a higher or lower bar based on the rank of the person solicited. It must prove the urging or advising, the intent that the offense occur, and that the object was a UCMJ offense, with enhanced exposure if the target was one of the four enumerated crimes that was then attempted or committed. A defense to solicitation, such as the absence of intent that the act actually be carried out, or that the communication was not genuinely a request to commit an offense, applies the same way regardless of whether the listener was senior or junior.
Conclusion
Solicitation of a superior is punishable under the same standard as solicitation of a peer. Article 82, as revised by the Military Justice Act of 2019, makes the offense turn on whether the accused solicited or advised another to commit a UCMJ offense with the intent that it be committed, with enhanced treatment reserved for solicitation of desertion, mutiny, misbehavior before the enemy, or sedition. The rank of the person solicited is not an element. Rank may still influence what offense is solicited, related charges, or sentencing, but those are separate considerations. A service member facing a solicitation allegation should consult qualified military defense counsel to assess intent, the object of the alleged solicitation, and any related charges.
Disclaimer
This article is provided strictly for general educational and informational purposes. It is intended to explain how the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), the Rules for Courts-Martial, the Military Rules of Evidence, and related military administrative processes work as a matter of public legal education. It does not constitute legal advice, a legal opinion, or a recommendation about any particular case, and it is not a substitute for advice from a qualified military defense attorney who can evaluate the specific facts and command, service, and jurisdictional circumstances involved.
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Military law also changes over time. The Military Justice Act of 2016 (effective January 1, 2019) and subsequent National Defense Authorization Acts renumbered and rewrote many punitive articles, revised the Article 32 preliminary hearing, and altered sentencing, clemency, and appellate procedures. Statutes, regulations, executive orders, the Manual for Courts-Martial, and decisions of the service Courts of Criminal Appeals and the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces may have been amended, superseded, or reinterpreted after this article was written, and article numbers or procedures cited here may have changed.
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