Article 88 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, codified at 10 U.S.C. 888, makes it an offense for a commissioned officer to use contemptuous words against certain high officials. Like most offenses under the UCMJ, a violation of Article 88 is subject to a statute of limitations, and that limitations period is supplied not by Article 88 itself but by Article 43, the UCMJ’s general statute-of-limitations provision. Understanding how Article 43 operates is essential to knowing how long the government has to bring an Article 88 charge.
The offense Article 88 defines
Article 88 applies only to commissioned officers. It prohibits an officer from using contemptuous words against the President, the Vice President, Congress, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of a military department, the Secretary of Homeland Security, or the Governor or legislature of any State, Commonwealth, or possession in which the officer is on duty or present. The offense requires that the accused was a commissioned officer, that the accused used contemptuous words against one of the named officials or bodies, that the words came to the knowledge of someone other than the accused, and that the words were contemptuous either in themselves or in light of the circumstances. The maximum punishment includes dismissal, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and confinement for up to one year.
Article 88 is one of the more narrowly applicable punitive articles, but a prosecution under it is still bound by the same timing rules that apply to ordinary UCMJ offenses.
The five-year limitations period under Article 43
Because Article 88 is not among the small set of offenses that carry no limitations period, it falls under the general rule in Article 43. That rule provides that a person may not be tried by court-martial for most offenses if the offense was committed more than five years before the receipt of sworn charges and specifications by an officer exercising summary court-martial jurisdiction over the command. In other words, the limitations period for an Article 88 violation is five years.
Two features of that rule deserve emphasis. First, the trigger that stops the clock is the receipt of sworn charges by the summary court-martial convening authority, not the date of trial or arraignment. The government does not have to complete a court-martial within five years; it must get sworn charges into the hands of the proper authority within that window. Second, the five-year clock runs from the date the offense was committed. For a contemptuous-words offense, that ordinarily means the date the words were used and came to the knowledge of a third person.
Offenses that have no limitations period, and why Article 88 is not among them
Article 43 carves out certain offenses for which there is no statute of limitations at all. These include absence without leave or missing movement in time of war, murder, rape and rape of a child, and any other offense punishable by death. Article 88 is none of these. It is not a capital offense, and it does not fall within the categories that Congress exempted from any time bar. As a result, the ordinary five-year period applies, and there is no basis to treat contempt toward officials as an offense that may be charged at any time.
Tolling and how the clock can be paused
The five-year period is not always a hard calendar count, because Article 43 includes tolling provisions that can pause the running of time in defined circumstances. The clock can be tolled while the accused is absent without leave or a fugitive from justice, and periods in which the accused was in a status or location that made it impractical to bring charges, such as certain combat-zone service, can also affect the computation. For a typical Article 88 case, however, these tolling provisions are unlikely to come into play, because the offense usually occurs while the officer is present and serving. The practical reality for most Article 88 allegations is a straightforward five-year window measured from the date of the contemptuous words to the receipt of sworn charges.
Why the limitations period matters in practice
The statute of limitations is an affirmative protection for the accused. If sworn charges for an Article 88 violation are not received by the summary court-martial convening authority within five years of the offense, and no tolling provision applies, the accused may raise the statute of limitations as a bar to trial. The military judge must ordinarily ensure the accused is aware of the right to assert the statute of limitations when the facts show the limitations period may have run. Because the defense can be waived if not raised, an officer who believes the limitations period has expired should make sure counsel evaluates the precise dates: when the words were spoken, when they came to a third person’s knowledge, and when sworn charges were received.
Summary
There is no special statute of limitations unique to Article 88. As an ordinary, non-capital UCMJ offense, contempt toward officials is governed by the general five-year limitations period in Article 43, measured from the date of the offense to the receipt of sworn charges by the summary court-martial convening authority, and subject to the tolling rules that apply to all offenses. Because the exact computation depends on the specific dates and any applicable tolling, an officer facing or anticipating an Article 88 charge should consult qualified military counsel and the current text of Articles 43 and 88.
Disclaimer
This article is provided strictly for general educational and informational purposes. It is intended to explain how the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), the Rules for Courts-Martial, the Military Rules of Evidence, and related military administrative processes work as a matter of public legal education. It does not constitute legal advice, a legal opinion, or a recommendation about any particular case, and it is not a substitute for advice from a qualified military defense attorney who can evaluate the specific facts and command, service, and jurisdictional circumstances involved.
Reading this article, or contacting any website on which it appears, does not create an attorney-client relationship between the reader and any law firm, attorney, or author. Every court-martial, nonjudicial punishment action, administrative separation, and security-clearance matter turns on its own facts, the charged articles, the convening authority, the service branch, and the evidence, and outcomes vary widely from one case to another.
Military law also changes over time. The Military Justice Act of 2016 (effective January 1, 2019) and subsequent National Defense Authorization Acts renumbered and rewrote many punitive articles, revised the Article 32 preliminary hearing, and altered sentencing, clemency, and appellate procedures. Statutes, regulations, executive orders, the Manual for Courts-Martial, and decisions of the service Courts of Criminal Appeals and the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces may have been amended, superseded, or reinterpreted after this article was written, and article numbers or procedures cited here may have changed.
For these reasons, no reader should act or decline to act based on this content without first consulting a licensed attorney experienced in military justice about their own situation. The author and publisher make no warranty, express or implied, as to the accuracy, completeness, timeliness, or current applicability of the information provided, and disclaim any liability for any action taken or not taken in reliance on it. If you are facing investigation, charges, or an adverse administrative action, time limits may apply, and you should seek qualified counsel promptly.